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THE SHIPPER'S RIGHT TO RECOVER
UNDER COGSA FOR DAMAGE TO
CONTAINERIZED CARGO
PATRICIA RYAN RECUPER0*
Modern advances in the technology of shipping have benefited
carriers by reducing the time and expense involved in the handling
of cargo. The shippers have shared in this reduction of shipping
expenses by paying reduced freights. However, problems have de-
veloped in applying laws enacted prior to World War II to the new
methods of cargo handling developed since 1940. This article will
examine one aspect of the problem: containerization and the carrier's
right to limit his liability.
Under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act' (COGSA), the carrier
is entitled under certain circumstances to claim a $500 limitation of
liability on each package he carries. If the shipper thinks that the
value of its goods exceeds the applicable limitation, it may declare
the higher value and obtain greater protection by paying increased
freight. This pattern of operation worked fairly well when both
shipper and carrier used the same concept of package. However,
technological innovations have radically altered the size, shape and
value of the units in which goods are shipped. The container, in
particular, is capable of holding many of the traditional cardboard
boxes once thought of as "packages." Thus, while both shipper and
carrier formerly were content to limit the carrier's liability per card-
board package to $500, carriers' recent attempts to limit their liabil-
ity to $500 per container have met with opposition from shippers.
This article will chronicle the growth of this dispute and will offer a
suggestion for its resolution.
Historically, under the traditional shipping agreement, the car-
rier was absolutely responsible for the safe delivery of the goods
which it carried. 2
 However, concomitantly with the expansion of
shipping during the nineteenth century, ship owners began to limit
their liability for damage to or loss of cargo. 3 Generally, the carriers
* instructor of Law, Boston College Law School; Member of the Massachusetts Bar,
' 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300 et seq. (1970).
2
 The Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. 7, 28 (1858).
3
 G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 119 et seq. (1957). American shipown-
ers had an extensive list of excepted perils:
Exceptions to liability. The excepted perils now include restraints of govern-
ments, seizure of goods or vessel under legal process, acts of God, enemies,
privateers, letters of marque or reprisal, rising of passengers, pirates, robbers,
thieves, vermin, barratry, collisions or fire at sea or in port, fire on wharf, in
warehouse or lighters, accidents to or from machinery, boilers or steam, explosions
at sea or in port from any cause whatever, desertion or revolt of the crew, strikes,
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avoided any liability by the insertion of exculpatory clauses in the
contract of carriage.
Due to the monopolistic control which could be exerted by a
group of carriers, the shippers were to a great extent at the mercy of
the carriers. Thus, the exculpatory clauses grew more common in
bills of lading. As the incidence of exculpatory clauses increased, so
did their scope. Initially, the clauses operated to exempt the carrier
from loss due to specifically described hazards. In their heyday,
however, the exculpatory clauses relieved the carrier from the effects
of his own negligence. 4 These expanded clauses gradually became
contracts of adhesion forced upon shippers by the carriers.
In 1893,. Congress sought to adjust this difference in bargaining
power by passage of the Harter Act. 5 In essence, the act removed
the carrier's negligence and the unseaworthiness of the vessel from
the scope of any permissible exculpatory clause. This represented a
compromise between the English and American approaches to the
problems arising between the shippers and carriers: the English
courts had endeavored to allow for the greatest possible freedom of
contract between the parties, while the American courts, although in
favor of the freedom of contract, had traditionally taken an un-
favorable view toward exculpatory clauses. 6 By 1919, the Harter
Act's restrictions on the scope of an effective exculpatory clause had
also been adopted by Australia, New Zealand and Canada.
After World War I, a drive for uniformity in ocean bills of
lading resulted in an international conference at The Hague, to
which twenty-four nations sent delegates.' The International Con-
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of
Lading8 was signed or adhered to by sixteen of the twenty-four
ice, stranding or any other accidents, lighterage, disasters or dangers of the seas,
rivers, land or of sail or steam navigation of what nature or whatever kind soever,
errors of navigation or in the management of said vessels, or any act, neglect or
default whatsoever of the pilot, masters or mariners. . . .
Crutcher, The Ocean Bill of Lading—A Study in Fossilization, 45 Tul. L. Rev. 698, 709
(1971). See also T. Scrutton, The Contract of Affreightment as Expressed in Charterparties
and Bills of Lading 234-41 (1923), wherein six pages of exclusions are listed.
4 Caterpillar Overseas, S.A. v. S.S. Expeditor, 318 F.2d 720, 722 (2d Cir. 1963).
5 46 U.S.C. $§ 190 et seq. (1970).
6 J. Lucas, Cases and Materials on Admiralty 598 (1969).
7 The first diplomatic conference regarding the regulation of ocean bills of lading was
held in Brussels in October 1922. Twenty-four nations sent duly appointed delegates and
sixteen nations signed or adhered to the convention in 1924. They were: Belgium; Chile;
Danzig; Estonia; France; Germany; Great Britain; Hungary; Italy; Japan; Yugoslavia;
Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Rumania; and the United States (signed by the United States
Ambassador at Brussels on June 23, 1925). When the convention was considered by the
Senate in 1935, six nations (Great Britain, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and
Hungary) had ratified the convention. 79 Cong. Rec. 4757 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Thomas).
s Reprinted at 79 Cong. Rec. 4754 et seq. (1935) [hereinafter cited as International
Convention].
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nations attending the conference. The dual purpose of the agreement
was the securing of uniformity9 in the laws of the leading commer-
cial countries on the subject of ocean bills of lading and the estab-
lishment of greater protection for shippers in the handling of their
goods." The latter goal—the protection of shippers—was accom-
plished by lengthening the applicable statute of limitations for suits
for damage to cargo," and by barring carriers from limiting their
liability below $500 per package or the real value of the goods,
whichever was the lesser." However, the aims, though clearly
stated, were not easily achieved, since the United States Senate did
not ratify the treaty until 1935.' 3
Although Article 10 of the convention provided that "[t]he
provisions of this convention shall apply to all bills of lading issued
in any of the contracting States,"" Congress was unsure whether
9 See Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 301 (1959).
1 ° Bissell, The Operational Realities of Containerization and Their Effect on the "Pack-
age" Limitation and the "On-Deck" Prohibition: Review and Suggestions, 45 Tul, L. Rev.
902, 903 (1971). See also 79 Cong. Rec. 4757 (1935) (remarks of Sen, Thomas); W. Tetley,
Marine Cargo Claims 234-35 (1965); Pan-Am Trade & Credit Corp. v. The Campfire, 156
F.2d 603, 605-06 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 774 (1946).
11 Article 3(6) of the International Convention, supra note 8, at 4754, provides:
Unless notice of loss or damage and the general nature of such loss or damage be
given in writing to the carrier or his agent at the port of discharge before or at the
time of the removal of the goods into the custody of the person entitled to delivery
thereof under the contract of carriage, such removal shall be prima facie evidence of
the delivery by the carrier of the goods as described in the bill of lading.
If the loss or damage is not apparent, the notice must be given within three days
of the delivery.
The notice in writing need not be given if the state of the goods has at the time
of their receipt been the subject of joint survey or inspection.
In any event the carrier and the ship 'shall be discharged from all liability in
respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the
goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered.
13 The limitation on exculpation from liability provides:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any
toss or damage to or in connection with goods in an amount exceeding [$500] per
package or unit or the equivalent of that sum in other currency unless the nature and
value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted
in the bill of lading. "
This declaration if embodied in the bill of lading, shall be prima facie evidence
but shall not be binding or conclusive on the carrier.
By agreement between the carrier, master, or agent of the carrier and the
shipper another maximum amount than that mentioned in this paragraph may be
fixed, provided that such maximum shall not be less than the figure above named.
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible in any event for loss or
damage to, or in connection with, goods if the nature or value thereof has been
knowingly misstated by the shipper in the bill of lading.
Article 4(5) of the International Convention, supra note 8, at 4755. Bracketed material reflects
conversion into American currency.
13
 For a discussion of the congressional treatment of the Convention and COGSA, see A.
Knauth, The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading 128-31 (4th ed. 1953).
14 79 Cong. Rec. at 4755.
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mere ratification of the treaty made its provisions binding on the
American shipping industry." For this reason," the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act.'" was enacted's in 1936 to "implement and make
effective the terms of the treaty already ratified." 1 g In Senate debate,
protection of shippers was advanced as the purpose of the bill. It
was noted that: "[O]ne of the outstanding purposes of the proposed
legislation [was] to increase the character and degree of responsibil-
ity of the carriers; and the bill was designed in large measure in the
interest of the shippers rather than of the carriers."2° Four major
changes in the current law were envisioned; all favored the
shipper. 21
 The first was the limitation of liability provision with
which this article is concerned:
Amount of liability; valuation of cargo.
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be
or become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection
with the transportation of goods in an amount exceeding
There are two questions which are left somewhat in doubt by the treaty. The
treaty is between this and other nations. The question arises—it is not suggested by
me, but by others—whether a treaty between this country and a foreign country
covers in the fullest degree questions arising between an American shipper and an
American carrier; in other words, whether an American citizen shipping on an
American vessel comes within the purview of the treaty provisions. This proposed
legislation is desirable to make certain that the general rules and regulations laid
down in this international undertaking apply to an American shipping upon an
American vessel. Then, another question arises as to whether this treaty covers the
case of an American shipper utilizing the vessel of a nation which is not a signatory
to the treaty. That question is left doubtful in the treaty. The proposed legislation
will remove those two doubts.
79 Cong. Rec. 13,341 (1935) (remarks of Sen, White).
16
 Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that Australia, Belgium, Netherlands,
India, Italy, Great Britain and 53 British possessions had also enacted the terms of
the convention by national legislation. However, the effective date of the Italian
decree was postponed to await similar action by other countries. 79 Cong. Rec. 4757
(1935) (remarks of Sen. Thomas).
17
 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300 et seq. (1970).
15
 49 Stat. 1210 et seq. (1936).
19
 79 Cong. Rec. 13,340 (1935) (remarks of Sen. White).
711
 Id. at 13,341 (remarks of Sen. White), See text at notes 72-77 infra.
21
 The legislation was viewed as working four principal changes in the law:
The first one has reference to the limit of liability. Under this provision I should
say generally that the limit of liability of the carrier is substantially increased.
The second change in the law is with respect to notice of a loss. Under the
Harter Act, the carrier may require as a condition precedent to liability notice of loss
within a very limited period of time. This bill very substantially restricts the right of
the carrier. with respect to the requirement of notice.
The present law imposes a very limited restriction on the right to bring suits
against the carrier for defaults of one sort onanother. This enlarges the time within
which a shipper who has suffered damage may bring his suit against the carrier.
The fourth change relates to the burden of proof, and here, again, the change is
so made that the shipper, the owner of the goods, is given great advantage over that
now accorded him under present law.
79 Cong. Rec. 13,341 (1935) (remarks of Sen. White).
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$500 per package lawful money of the United States, or in
case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary
freight unit, or the equivalent of that sum in other cur-
rency, unless the nature and value of such goods have been
declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the
bill of lading. This declaration, if embodied in the bill of
lading, shall be prima facie evidence, but shall not be
conclusive on the carrier.
By agreement between the carrier, master, or agent of
the carrier, and the shipper another maximum amount
than that mentioned in this paragraph may be fixed: Pro-
vided, That such maximum shall not be less than the figure
above named. In no event shall the carrier be liable for
more than the amount of damage actually sustained.
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible in
any event for loss or damage to or in connection with the
transportation of the goods if the nature or value thereof
has been knowingly and fraudulently misstated by the
shipper in the bill of lading. 22
This limitation has considerable value as a means of maintain-
ing a proper balance between the rights and liabilities of the carrier
and the rights and responsibilities of the shipper. However, its
application has not been without problems of interpretation. One
question which has arisen repeatedly is whether the cargo involved
was a "package" 23 within the meaning of COGSA—a matter consis-
tently declared to be a question of fact for resolution by the court. 24
The determination may not be easy. 25 Certain cases are clear; con-
ventional packages—bale, barrel, carton, etc.—pose no problem.
However, when a relatively large self-contained object is being
shipped, the problems of construction become more difficult. In
Studebaker v. Charlton, S.S. Co., 26 the King's Bench was faced
11 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1970) (emphasis added). Protection of the shipper is secured by 46
U.S.C. § '1303(8) (1970), which states:
Any clause, covenant or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or
the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with the goods, arising
from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this
section, or lessening such liability otherwise than as prOvided in this chapter, shall be
null and void and of no effect. . . .
23
 W. Tetley, supra note 10, at 235.
24
 Traditionally, there has been no right to a jury trial in most admiralty cases; this is
particularly true in actions in rem. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 3, at 31.
25 See the collection of authorities interpreting the term "package" in Annot., 94
A.L,R.2d 1412 (1962).
26 59 Lloyd's List L.R. 23, 27 (K.B. 1937). Note, however, that this case was decided by
the King's Bench while interpreting the Harter Act. Mr. Justice Goddard stated;
[Title cars were put on board without any covering, or, to state it in another way,
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with the question of whether an automobile which was not enclosed
in any wrapping was a package under the Harter Act. Since no
packing had taken place, the automobile was not considered a
package. Similarly, in Gulf Italia Co. v. S.S. Exiria," a tractor, the
superstructure of which was partially boxed and covered with
waterproofing paper but the base of which was left exposed, was
held not to be a package. 28
However, in Indidi Supply Mission v. S. S. Overseas Joyce, 29 a
locomotive was considered to be a package although no wrapping
whatsoever was applied to the engine. The shipper had argued that
the carrier's limit on liability should be computed not on the basis of
a package, but by the alternative rule of multiplying $500 by the
number of freight units, e.g., cubic feet. However, the trial judge
rejected this method of computing the carrier's liability because it
would result in a judgment far in excess of the freights charged. 3 °
This reasoning was relied upon in a subsequent case in which heavy
machinery was shipped on skids to facilitate handling. 3 ' Neverthe-
less, in this case the justification for characterization of the machin-
ery as a package emerges more clearly from the fact that the
machinery was put on skids to aid in handling. 32
These conceptual problems are magnified in the consideration
of the appropriate measure of liability where the goods are enclosed
in a modern type of transportation equipment. The interaction of
the old laws and the new shipping technology will now be consid-
just as they came from the works. I confess I do not see how I can hold that there is
any package to which the clause can refer. "Package" must indicate something
packed.
Id.
27
 160 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd sub nom. Gulf Italia Co. v. American Export
Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1959).
28
 Although the tractor did have some of the qualities of a bundle put up for transporta-
tion, the trial judge did not wish to penalize a prudent shipper and encourage the shipper
"who cavalierly makes no effort to reduce the possibility of loss . . . ." 160 F. Supp. at 960.
29
 246 F. Supp. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
3° Note, however, that Judge Tyler in India Supply Mission views COGSA as having
been enacted to protect carriers. Id. at 539. It is submitted that the legislative history
specifically contradicts this view. See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text. Judge Tyler
took a similar view in a more recent case, Rosenbruch v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines,
Inc., 357 F. Supp. 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), where the issue was whether a container or the
packages within the container were to be considered a package under COGSA. Id. at 984-85.
11 Middle East Agency, Inc. v. The John R. Waterman, 86 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y.
1949).
32 Id. at 488. A dismantled rock crusher was also in the same cargo. It was in twenty-one
parts, of which eleven were crated, five were mounted on skids, four were in cases, and one
piece was unboxed. Twenty of the items were held to be packages. The unboxed piece was
not, and liability was based on the customary freight unit. See generally A. Knauth, supra
note 13, at 270-71. A discussion of liability under the customary freight unit clause is beyond
the scope of this article.
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ered with particular emphasis on the recovery of damages by ship-
pers.
Traditionally, the handling of cargo in package form required
numerous individual transfers to and from various vehicles." A
shipment of 100 television sets required 100 separate transfers from
plant to van, from van to ship, and at destination, from ship to pier.
Thus, a minimum of 300 individual handlings was required. This
mode of operation was costly, time consuming and dangerous. 34 It
became clear to shippers and carriers that a method of consolidation
of cargo would generate great savings. Ideally, the consolidated
piece or container could be moved once at each transfer point.
The beginnings of containerization can be seen in an early
English case, Whaite v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry., 35 in which
ten oil paintings were packed in a wagon which was open on the
top. The wagon was placed on a truck and transported to the
railroad. The train on which the wagon was placed was involved in
a collision, damaging the paintings. The defendant relied on the
Carriers Act, 36 which limited the carrier's liability for the contents of
any "parcel or package" to 10£. The court ruled that the wagon was
a package within the meaning of the act, since the shipper had
prepared or packed the paintings for transportation. 37
During the twentieth century, the consolidation of cargo be-
came more sophisticated than the informal use of large objects to
hold or protect several smaller items. 38 One advancement, for ex-
ample, was the adoption of palletization, a method of stowing cargo
on rectangular trays designed to be transported by fork-lift trucks. 39
In the example used above, 40 four or eight of the 100 television sets
might have been lashed together on a pallet and thereafter moved as
a unit rather than individually.
In Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische
Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft, 41 seven pallets of cargo, each of
33
 This method of operation has been described as break-bulk. Comment, Legal and
Regulatory Aspects of the Container Revolution, 57 Geo. L.J. 533, 535 (1969). "To break-
bulk" has been defined as "to destroy the entirety of a ship's cargo considered as a unit by
opening the hatches and commencing to unload." R. De Kerchove, International Maritime
Dictionary 95 (2d ed. 1961).
34 Bissell, supra note 10, at 910.
35 L.R. 9 Ex. 67 (1874),
36
 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Wm. 4, c, 68, § 1 (1830).
37 L.R. 9 Ex. at 69-70.
The United States Army utilized a "Conex" box during and following World War II. It
was usually 8' x 8' x 8'. McDowell, Containerization: Comments on Insurance and Liability,
3 J. Mar. L. & Com. 503, 503-04 (1972).
39 R. De Kerchove, supra note 33, at 565.
40 See text at notes 33-34 supra.
° I 375 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1967). The pallets were formed by placing three tiers of two
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which contained six cartons of forty television tuners, failed to be
delivered by the carrier. The ensuing litigation raised the question of
carrier liability under COGSA for such a shipment. 42
 The carrier
computed the amount of its admitted liability for the undelivered
pallets at seven packages times $500, or $3500. 43 Claiming that the
pallets were merely mechanical devices, and in light of the fact that
the goods were collectively valued at $16,800, the consignee con-
tended that each of the cartons on a pallet should be considered a
package. 44
 The carrier's liability would thereby be increased. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that each pallet was a
package under COGSA since each of the pallets had the characteris-
tics of a "bundle put up for transportation." 45 In support of its view,
the court cited the bill of lading and correspondence between the
parties in which they referred to the pallets as packages. 46 The court
farther supported its decision by noting that the pallets were made
up by the shipper, 47
 who thus by his very action indicated an
intention to form a package. A vigorous dissent argued that since
the pallets were not enclosed on the sides, they should not be
considered packages." This should be so, reasoned the dissenting
judge, because the pallets only provided minimal protection and the,
carrier could easily count the individual packages in each pallet.
Furthermore, since both shipper and carrier benefit from palletiza-
cartons on a platform, covering the cartons with a wooden deck to protect the cartons from
other cargo and from the metal straps which were placed around the unit. When bound with
the metal straps, the dimensions of the pallets were 39" x 33" x 42", Id. at 944-45.
42 Prior to Standard Electrica, three cases had dealt with issues of palletized cargo in the
context of COGSA's limitation of liability: Middle East Agency, Inc. v. The John B. Water-
man, 86 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Gulf Italia Co. v. S.S. Exiria, 160 F. Supp. 956
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Gulf Italia Co. v. American Export Lines,
Inc., 263 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1959); Mitsubishi Intl Corp. v. S.S. Palmetto State, 311 F.2d 382
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 922 (1963). In The John B. Waterman, parts of a rock
crusher were placed individually on skids; all of the pieces were deemed to be packages
although some were not encased. 86 F. Supp. at 492. The Exiria limited The John B.
Waterman to articles placed on skids to facilitate transport of the item rather than to protect
it. 160 F. Supp. at 959. The Palmetto State involved a completely encased 321/2 ton roll of
steel; it was held to be a package within the statutory meaning of the word. 311 F.2d at 384.
It is important to note, however, that these cases do not determine the outcome in Standard
Electrica since in each of these cases the pallet held one item, while in Standard Electrica
each pallet held six cartons. See Bissell, supra note 10, at 910.
A similar result was later reached in Aluminos Pozuelo Ltd. v. S.S. Navigator, 407 F.2d
152 (2d Cir. 1968). A three ton press on skids was held to be a package within COGSA.
43 375 F.2d at 944.
44
 Id. at 947 (dissenting opinion).
45 Id. at 946.
46 Id. The dissent noted, however, that the carrier's agent referred to the loss as one of
"42 cartons." Id. at 948 (dissenting opinion),
42 Id. at 944.
'a Id. at 947-48 (dissenting opinion). However, the dissenting judge reserved the question
of containers, preferring to focus for the moment on the minimum requirements of a "pack-
age." Id. at 948. (dissenting opinion).
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tion, the dissent dismissed as irrelevant the fact that the shipper
himself had palletized the cargo. 49
Today, advances in shipping have proceeded far beyond pal-
letization. The concept of what constitutes a package which was
current at the time of passage of COGSA in 1935 5° is rapidly being
replaced by the concept of a container.st Consequently, many new
problems have arisen in the area of carrier liability. The Coast
Guard has defined a container as:
[Nil article of transport equipment (liftvan, portable tank,
or other similar structure including normal accessories and
equipment when imported with the container), other than
a vehicle or conventional packaging—
(1) Of a permanent character and accordingly strong
enough to be suitable for 'repeated use;
(2) Specifically designed to facilitate the carriage of
goods by one or more modes of transport, without
intermediate reloading;
(3) Fitted with devices permitting its ready handling,
particularly its transfer from one mode of transport to
another; -
(4) So designed as to be easy to fill and empty; and
(5) Having an internal volume of 1 cubic meter (35.3
' cubic feet) or more. 52	;
A standard size container has dimensions of 8' x 8' x
although the length of the container might vary up to forty
feet. 54 Thus, one container can accommodate many individual pack-
49 Id. (dissenting opinion).
s° The Standard Electrica court noted:
No 'doubt the drafters had in mind a unit that would be fairly uniform and
predictable in size, and one that would provide a common sense standard so that the
parties could easily ascertain at the time of contract when additional coverage was
needed, place the risk of additional loss upon one or the other, and thus avoid the
pains of litigation.
Id. at 945 (footnote omitted).
51 "[M]ore than half of all general cargo moving over the docks at the Port of Oakland,
for example, was in containers." Crutcher, The Ocean Bill of Lading—A Study in Fossiliza-
tion, 45 Tul, L. Rev. 697, 721 (1971); 72 Am. Import & Export Bull. 242 (April 1970).
52 49 C.F.R. § 420.3(c) (1972),
" Lyons, Some Thoughts on General Average in the Container Age, 2 J. Mar. L. &
Corn. 165 n.1 (1970). See also Rosenbruch v. Ainerican Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 357
F. Supp. 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), where a container measuring 40' x 8' x 8' was characterized
by the court as "standard." Id. at 983.
54 Hickey, Legal Problems Relating to Combined Transport and Barge Carrying Vessels,
45 Tul. L. Rev. 863 n.2 (1971). S. 2419, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1969) would have provided for
the standardization of containers in order to promote intermodal transportation systems. A bill
enacted on March 16, 1968, however, provided that "the United States shall not give
preference as between carriers upon the basis of length, height, or width of cargo containers
59 ,
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ages while affording them greater protection during shipping than
could the average pallet. 55
 If, to return to the example used
earlier, 56
 the 100 televisions sets had been loaded into a container at
the warehouse, only the container itself would have to be handled at
any transfer point. The result would be great savings in both han-
dling expenses and shipping costs. 57
As the modes of shipping changed, the question of the carrier's
liability under COGSA remained unclear. The Standard Electrica
decision seemed58
 to indicate that the container would be viewed as
a package for purposes of computing carrier liability. A fully en-
closed shipment of numerous ,packages was certain to be considered
a "package" under the majority's reasoning. Yet when presented
with the question in Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 59 the
Second Circuit resolved the issue in favor of the owner of the goods.
In that case, Leather's Best, Inc., purchased approximately eleven
tons of leather from a German firm. The leather was wrapped into
99 bales averaging four feet in length, two feet in width, and
one-and-one-half feet in height. 6° This was done to qualify the cargo
as "bales" under the applicable tariff, which had a fixed rate per
kilogram for leather in bales or rolls. The carrier dispatched a truck
with a 40' x 8' x 8' container to the seller's plant. The truck driver
watched the seller's employees load the bales into the container and
issued a receipt for 99 bales of leather." The carrier's agent later
issued a bill of lading which described the goods: "Number and kind
. . . .° 46 U.S.C. § 1122(f) (1970). Earlier, •the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries had concluded that standardization of the sizes of containers was not essential. H.R.
Rep. No. 991, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1967).
55
 One commentator has catalogued some advantages of containerization:
The theory of intermodal transport is based on the consolidation of several break-
bulk units into a single interchangeable transportation unit that can be carried via a
combination of several modes of transportation, under a single shipping document
and a single freight charge, from the shipper's warehouse to the consignee's
warehouse. The container is the interchangeable transportation unit which it was
hoped would prove to be the integrating element of an intermodal transportation
system.
Bissell, supra note 10, at 910.
56 See text at notes 33-34 supra.
57
 Increased speed in the handling of containers in loading and discharge makes it
possible for ships to run four days at sea for one day in port, as opposed to the former 1:1
ratio. Costs in stevedoring are reduced by 50%. Crutcher, supra note 51, at 721. A highly
productive containership has five times the earning capacity of the traditional break-bulk
cargo ship. Id., citing Cong. Info. Bur, Bull. 7 (May 19, 1970). See also 73 Am. Import &
Export Bull. 485 (July 1970).
54
 Note that the Standard Electrica court was not faced with the problems of containeri-
zation. 375 F.2d at 943.
59
 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971), affg in part and rev'g in part 313 F. Supp. 1373
(E.D.N.Y. 1970).
6° 451 F.2d at 804. However, the district court reported that the bales were 46 feet long.
313 F. Supp. at 1374. This would seem to be impossible if the container was only 40 feet long.
61
 313 F. Supp. at 1374.
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of packages; description of goods: 1 container s.t.c. 99 bales of
leather."62 Also on the bill of lading was a provision limiting liability
to $500 per container. 63
The container reached the United States aboard the vessel
Mormaclynx, where it was unloaded and placed in a large terminal
area. When the consignee arrived to pick up the container, it could
not be located." Leather's Best thereupon filed suit against the ship,
the carrier, and the operator of the terminal. The district court ruled
that each of the 99 bales shipped in the sealed container was a
"package" for purposes of computing the carrier's liability. 65
On appeal, the Second Circuit ruled that the container was not
a package under COGSA's limitation of liability provision. Rather,
the 99 bales which had been placed inside were considered to be the
measure of liability. 66 In reaching its decision, the appellate court
was faced with the precedent of Standard Electrica. 67 However, it
found the facts of the case at bar distinguishable:
Several factors distinguish Standard Electrica from
this case. The pallets were nothing like the size of the
container here; they had been made up by the shipper; and
the dock receipt, the bill of lading, and libellant's claim
letter all indicated that the parties regarded each pallet as a
"package." . Indeed, there seems to have been nothing
in the shipping documents in that case that gave the carrier
any notice of the number of cartons."
The court further reasoned that the purpose of the limitation of
liability provision in COGSA was "to set a reasonable figure be-
low which the carrier should not. permitted to limit his lia-
bility . . . ."69 The imposition of a $500 limit of liability for all the
goods enclosed in a container would nullify the purposes of COGSA.
This is especially true where the carrier was informed of the general
nature of the cargo—valuable leather in bales—and knew the total
weight and quantity. Finally, the court noted the meaning ascribed
to the word "package" in Standard Electrica: " 'a unit that would be
fairly uniform and predictable in size, and one that would provide a
62 451 F.2d at 804.
63
 The clause read: "Shipper hereby agrees that carrier's liability is limited to $500 with
respect to the entire contents of each container except when shipper declares a higher
valuation and shall have paid additional freight on such declared valuation , . . ," Id.
64
 The empty container was later found abandoned in Freeport, Long Island. The details
of the theft were never reconstructed. 313 F. Supp. at 1375-77.
65 Id. at 1380-82.
66 451 F.2d at 815-16.
375 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1967).
6I5 451 F.2d at 815 (citation omitted),
69 Id.
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common sense standard so that the parties could easily ascertain .. .
when additional coverage was needed . . . " 70
 The court ulti-
mately concluded that the units in which the shipper had packed the
goods—the bales—corresponded more closely to the concept of
package as used in COGSA than did the large metal container. 71
A number of factors, not discussed in the Second Circuit's
opinion, nevertheless urge the court's conclusions. First, there is the
purpose of COGSA itself—to protect shippers against the superior
bargaining position of the carrier. 72
 As has been noted," this view
was advanced in the congressional debates on COGSA. 74 In that
light, COGSA has been construed as designed to avoid great in-
equality of bargaining power and resulting adhesion contracts. 75 In
Leather's Best, the carrier provided the bill of lading. No bargaining
as to its terms took place; in fact, it might be inferred that the bill
was a standard one customarily employed by all carriers on the
North Atlantic. 76
 To give effect to the clause deeming the container
to be a package would defeat the protective aims of COGSA.
Secondly, foreign77
 courts faced with this issue have likewise
concluded that liability should be determined by the contents of the
container rather than by the container itself. The Supreme Court of
France ruled that where fifty-nine parcels were stolen from several
containers while in the hands of the carrier, the individual parcels
were the units of liability rather than the containers. 78 A similar
result was reached by a Moroccan court in dealing with a van of
7° Id. at 814, quoting 375 F.2d at 945.
71 451 F.2d at 815.
" "This apparent onesidedness is a common sense recognition of the inequality in
bargaining power which [COGSA was] designed to redress . . . ." G. Gilmore & C. Black,
The Law of Admiralty 125 (1957).
73 See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
74 See 79 Cong. Rec. 13,341 (1935) (remarks of Sen. White), quoted in text at note 20
supra.
" Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschififahrts-
Gesellschaft, 375 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir. 1967); Caterpillar Overseas, S.A. v. S.S. Expeditor,
318 F.2d 720, 722 (2d Cir. 1963).
76 The bill of lading specifically referred to the tariff of the relevant freight conference.
451 F.2d at 804.
77 A United States district court, when faced with an almost identical fact pattern as that
presented in Leather's Best, also reached a similar result. Inter-American Foods, Inc. v.
Coordinated Caribbean Transport, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1970). There, the
carrier dispatched a van when requested by the shipper. At the shipper's plant, the van was
loaded under the driver's supervision. The van was then driven to the seaport and loaded on
board a ship for transportation to Miami. Id. at 1336. The court ruled that the individual
cartons were the proper units of liability under COGSA since the carrier had actual knowl-
edge of the number of cartons in the container which the carrier itself had provided. Id. at
1339.
78 Ste. Navale Caennaise v. Gastin (S.S. 'see), Jurisprudence Francaise, Oct. 12, 1964,
at 18, digested in Inter-American Foods, Inc. v. Coordinated Caribbean Transport, Inc., 313
F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 1970), and Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 313 F.
Supp. 1373, 1382 (E.D.N.V, 1970).
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furniture. The Court of Original Jurisdiction of Casablanca, inter-
preting the Moroccan Maritime Code, stated in Perregaux v. Lignes
Franco-Marocaines that:
A furniture van is not to be considered a single package for
the application of the legal limit of liability of the maritime
carrier stipulated in Art. 266 .of the Moroccan Maritime
Code. It is obviously intended to contain numerous pack-
ages or objects."
The district court's reliance on the Perregaux case in Leather's Best
would seem to indicate that the statement of the number of bales of
leather inside the container was not necessary, since a furniture
van's inventory would be diverse, and would not be recorded on the
bill of lading. However, when Leather's Best reached the Second
Circuit, the court reserved decision on this issue as well as on the
issue of whether the ownership of the container would require a
different outcome."
In Royal Typewriter Co. v. MIV Kulmerland," the issues re-
served in Leather's Best were squarely raised, since the container
was provided by the shipper's agent, and the bill of lading provided
simply: "1 container said to contain machinery." 82 The facts of
Royal Typewriter are as follows. On December 1, 1967, the Royal
Typewriter Company ordered and paid for 1050 adding machines
from a manufacturer in Berlin, West Germany. The adding
machines were delivered in cardboard boxes to Royal's international
freight forwarding agents, Kuhne & Nagel. 83 At Kuhne & Nagel's
West Berlin warehouse, the individually wrapped machines were
divided into three groups of 350 cartons each. Each group was then
placed in a single container for railroad transportation to Hamburg
and subsequent delivery to Hapag/Lloyd A.G., a shipping line, for
ocean transportation to New York. The three containers arrived at
the Port of Hamburg intact. They were loaded aboard Lloyd's
79 Jurisprudence, May 25, 1957, at 52, digested in Leather's Best, 313 F. Supp, at 1382.
The Perregaux decision can be contrasted with the approach taken in Rosenbruch v. Ameri-
can Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), where a container
loaded with household goods was held to be a package under COGSA. Id. at 985. This view
was adopted although the bill of lading indicated that the contents of the container were used
household goods. Id. at 984.
80 451 F.2d at 815. In the course of its decision, the court noted that the container was
functionally a part of the ship. Id. However, while it is true that a container ship carries only
containerized cargo, the containers are interchangeable. There was apparently no showing
that this container was the only one which could be used by the Mormaclynx. Thus, since
both parties benefit from containerization, id. at 815 n.19, this notation ought not to be
considered a basis of the court's decision.
81 346 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
81 Id. at 1024.
81 Id. The statement of facts in the text is derived from Judge Tyler's opinion.
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vessel, the MJV Kulmerland. A clean bill of lading was issued
acknowledging receipt of the containers. The bill provided for
transport of the containers to New York, where they were to be
delivered to Royal Typewriter's customs broker.
On December 20, 1967, the Kulmerland arrived in New York
and began discharging its cargo at the 17th Street Terminal. The
containers were placed in a farm area, an enfenced field within the
pier complex which is used for storage. Approximately two weeks
later, a watchman, while making his rounds, noticed that one of the
containers had been broken into and that its contents were missing.
The adding machines were never recovered.
Royal filed a suit in admiralty against Lloyd and the MJV
Kulmerland to recover damages for the loss of the 350 adding
machines. Three companies were joined as third-party defendants:
Pioneer Terminal Corporation (Pioneer), International Terminal
Operating Company, Inc. (International) and Sullivan Security Ser-
vices, Inc. (Sullivan). Pioneer is a New York corporation which
contracted with Lloyd to provide terminal and stevedoring services
and facilities in connection with the discharging and loading of
Lloyd's vessels in the Port of New York. Pioneer, however, subcon-
tracted with International to provide these services at the 17th Street
Terminal in Brooklyn. Sullivan had a contractual agreement with
International to guard and protect cargo at the terminal. The trial
judge found in favor of Royal against Lloyd and its vessel, but held
that the limitation of liability in COGSA was applicable, and thus
the carrier was only liable for $500 damages. 84
 The trial judge
reasoned that the facts of Royal Typewriter were beyond the scope
of the Second Circuit's decision in Leather's Best:
In my view, therefore, this case squarely presents
what Chief Judge Friendly described as a "left open" mat-
ter in his discussion in Leather's Best, Inc  To track
his language, ". . . it leaves open, for example, what the
result would be if Freudenberg had packed the bales in a
container already on its premises and the bill of lading had
given no information with respect to the number of bales."
Here Feiler, the shipper, through its agent Kuhne & Nagel,
packed the adding machines in a container on the agent's
premises in West Berlin. Further, the ocean bill recited
only "1 Container said to contain Machinery." 85
He therefore concluded that since the shipper chose the container,
84 Id. at 1025.
as
 Id. at 1024 (citation omitted).
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the shipper "must accept the result, which is a recovery . . 	 of
$500."86
That the bill of lading in Royal Typewriter did not declare the
number of packages within the container should not be considered
controlling on the issue of the amount of the carrier's liability. The
Royal Typewriter court's reliance on the bill of lading was perhaps
adapted from Standard Electrica, wherein the court considered
determinative the fact that the bill of lading referred to "9 pallets"
rather than to 54 cartons. 87 For the Standard Electrica court, the
notations on the bill of lading controlled liability despite the fact that
the naked eye could count the number of cartons involved. It is
regrettable that the court in Royal Typewriter extended the ruling in
Standard Electrica beyond the very particular facts to which it was
attuned.
In its business operations, the relevant factors for the carrier are
the weight and contents of the container. For example, in Leather's
Best the freight was based on the weight multiplied by the applica-
ble rate per kilogram for leather in bales; 88 the number of bales was
irrelevant. Royal Typewriter, in which the container was sealed
before delivery to the carrier, serves as another example: the carrier
showed no concern for the contents of the container in determining
freight. 89
In Rosenbruch v. American Export I sbrandtsen Lines, Inc.,"
Judge Tyler, who authored the Royal Typewriter opinion, had occa-
sion to address himself to the issue of notation of the contents of a
container and subsequent proof at trial. Rosenbruch had arranged
for carriage of his household goods from New York to Germany. A
container was delivered to Rosenbruch's agent in New York; it was
loaded and transmitted to the carrier by the agent. The container
was lost at sea. In the ensuing litigation, Judge Tyler noted that
predictability could best be achieved by treating the container as a
package wherever the shipper loads the container with only his own
goods. 9 ' He further opined: "The accident of notations on the bill of
lading as to package count is too uncertain to govern. Problems of
proof would inhere . . ."92 It is submitted that this approach
unnecessarily burdens shippers.
86 Id. at 1025.
81 375 F.2d at 946.
88 451 F.2d at 804.
89 346 F. Supp. at 1021-22. The court noted that this was not the standard aluminum
container. However, since it must have been large enough to hold 350 adding machines, the
container is herein treated as one customarily used on container ships. See note 80 supra.
" 357 F. Supp, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
93
 Id. at 985.
92 Id.
65
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The carrier is under an obligation to indicate the number of
packages received on the bill of lading, but he need not do so if he
has no way of verifying the number. 93 Even if the unverified
number is shown on the bill, however, the shipper is not bound by
the figure; it is not even prima facie evidence of the contents of the
container. 94 This conclusion is further reinforced by the practice of
noting "1 container, s.t.c. [said to contain] . . ." The requirement
of indicating number of packages received, like so much of COGSA,
should be seen as intended to protect the shipper, 95 who, absent
such notation, would have to rely solely on traditional methods of
proof to establish the make-up of the shipment. To disregard the
contents and to determine liability on a container basis would be to
controvert the major purpose of COGSA by granting undue advan-
tage to the carrier. Except in the rare cases where the carrier has
actual knowledge of the contents, 96 $500 would be the sole liability
for a container load of goods. Furthermore, the realities of con-
tainerized shipping are such that most carriers would never note the
contents of the container. Since inland shippers must, for their own
protection, seal containers prior to through transportation, 97 the
carrier will have no means of verifying the contents of the container
and thus will have an added reason not to note the contents on the
bill.
In containerization disputes, that which should be controlling is
the proof at trial. If the shipper or its consignee adequately proves
93
 The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300 et seq. (1970), provides in part:
After receiving the goods into his charge the carrier, or the master or agent of
the carrier, shall, on demand of the shipper, issue to the shipper a bill of lading
showing among other things—
(a) The leading marks necessary for identification of the goods as the same are
furnished in writing by the shipper before the loading of such goods starts, provided
such marks are stamped or otherwise shown clearly upon the goods if uncovered, or
on the cases or coverings in which such goods are contained, in such a manner as
should ordinarily remain legible until the end of the voyage.
(b) Either the number of packages or pieces, or the quantity or weight, as the
case may be, as furnished in writing by the shipper.
(c) The apparent order and condition of the goods: Provided, That no carrier,
master, or agent of the carrier, shall be bound to state or show in the bill of lading
any marks, number, quantity, or weight which he has reasonable ground for suspect-
ing not accurately to represent the goods actually received, or which he has had no
reasonable means of checking.
46	 § 1303(3) (1970).
94 Simon, Admiralty Jurisdiction and the Liability of Wharfingers, 3 J. Mar. L. & Corn.
514, 517 (1972).
95 See text at notes 20, 73-75 supra.
" See, e.g., Inter-American Foods, Inc. v. Coordinated Caribbean Transport, Inc., 313
F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1970), noted in 2 J. Mar. L. & Corn. 438 (1971).
97
 In Royal Typewriter Co. v. M/V Kulmerland, 346 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), a
railway refused to accept an unsealed container, thus indicating the shipper's dilemma. The
container in Rosenbruch was also sealed prior to transport to the carrier. .357 F. Supp. at 983.
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the contents of the container, it should have its recovery measured
accordingly. This procedure would not prejudice the carrier since it
need not generally concern itself with the number of packages in any
shipment. 98
 His needs are fully met by disclosure of weight, size and
descriptive terms. Arguably, it would promote uniformity and
predictability99
 if the container were treated as a package whenever
possible. Yet the strong congressional intent to protect shippers must
be seen as overriding the mere desire for simplicity. Similarly, to
advocate that the shipper may protect itself by declaring the con-
tents of the container and paying higher freight in return for greater
carrier liability'"° totally negates the purpose of "per package" limi-
tation; the shipper should not be forced to pay for the protection
which is rightfully its under COGSA.
Moreover, the ownership of the container should not be consid-
ered controlling.'°' Thus, the fact that the container in Royal
Typewriter was owned by the shipper's agent should not be equated
with an intention that the container be considered a package. Own-
ership of the container is irrelevant to the handling of goods, in that
a container is equipment to be used in transport by various carriers.
Surely a railroad car belonging to Georgia Pacific is the responsibil-
ity of Penn Central while on Penn Central tracks and in Penn
Central trains. If the car and its contents are switched to another
line, the responsibility would also shift. In Royal Typewriter, the
container was used in rail and ocean transport. Thus, it can be seen
that the important factor is the interchangeability of containers, not
their ownership. No savings result to either party if a series of
containers must be used, as this procedure would necessitate an
interchange of the cargo. Therefore, containers owned by different
individuals should be adaptable for transportation by any type of
" "The carrier's freight rates depend on various factors, such as, the nature of the goods
and their weight or cubic displacement in the ship. Package limitations have never been a
consideration in arriving at freight rates." Simon, supra note 94, at 517. This would seem true
in light of the carrier's status as a common carrier.
" See Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 20 (2d
Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
I" This was the approach ultimately taken by Judge Tyler in Rosenbruch.
More important, however, is the question of insurance. Viewing the issue from
the insurance vantage point, the choice is between requiring the carrier to increase
its coverage and pass on the costs of same to all shippers, even those who prefer
cheaper rates and higher risks, and granting the option to the shipper to obtain that
coverage he requires. COGSA, while pre-dating containers, did not pre-date marine
insurance. This choice was before the Congress, and, on examination of the terms of
§ 4(5), I conclude that the legislature opted for the second alternative.
357 F. Supp. at 985 (footnote omitted).
Judge Tyler observed in Rosenbruch: "Ownership or possession in and of itself,
cannot be dispositive. . . . It, along with the entire record must be considered, and inferences
drawn as to the knowledge of the shipper and carrier—and the mutual understanding of the
parties." Id. at 984,
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carrier. Hampering the interchange of containers by penalizing
shippers for providing their own containers would be ill-advised
because the entire shipping industry benefits from the use of con-
tainers.
In conclusion, containerized operations can afford great advan-
tages to both shipper and carrier. However, if the container is used
to measure the per package liability of carriers under COGSA, the
shipper's risks are substantially increased by the use of this new
technology. Fairness demands a more flexible approach than knee-
jerk application of $500 liability per 8' x 8' x 40' container, even
where the bill of lading fails to disclose the contents of the container.
The carrier can be presumed to have notice that the contents of such
a large item are worth more than $500, and thus would not be
prejudiced by taking unexpected risks. It is therefore unfortunate
that in February 1968, a Protocol was issued which modified the
1924 Convention. It is to become effective three months after ten
countries, including five major shipping nations, ratify or accede to
its terms. It provides:
(a) Unless the nature and value of such goods have been
declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the
bill of lading, neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any
event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in
connection with the goods in an amount exceeding the
equivalent of 10,000 francs per package or unit or 30
francs per kilo of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged
whichever is the higher. . . . (c) Where a container, pallet
or similar article of transport is used to consolidate goods,
the number of packages or units enumerated in the bill of
lading as packed in such article of transport shall be
deemed the number of packages or units for the purpose of
this paragraph as far as these packages or units are con-
cerned. Except as aforesaid such article of transport shall
be considered the package or unit. 1 °2
It is submitted that the Protocol's requirement of a statement in
the bill of lading regarding the number of packages in the container
is unworkable, and ought to be rejected.'° 3 The effective use of
containers requires that ocean carriers receive containers which have
been sealed at the point of loading. This loading may take place far
inland. Thus, the carrier will have no knowledge of the actual
102 The development of this clause is chronicled in De Curse, The "Container Clause" in
Article 4(5) of the 1968 Protocol to the Hague Rules, 2 J. Mar. L. & Com. 131 (1971).
"3 The United States has not ratified the Protocol. See Correspondence, 3 J. Mar. L. &
Com. 209-11 (1972).
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contents of a container when it reaches the harbor; and the contents
of the container will not be noted on the bill of lading. Under such
circumstances, the operation of the Protocol will be thwarted. A
more workable solution would be to allow the shipper to prove the
contents of the container at trial without regard to the notations on
the bill of lading.
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